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AN EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE NATURE OF
NONECONOMIC COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
AND THEIR REGULATION
Ronald J. Allen,* Alexia Brunet** & Susan Spies Roth***
THE EMPEROR'S CLOTHES AND THE VALUE OF
NONECONOMIC HARMS
We are not torts scholars. Our scholarly interests, while somewhat
different, intersect over epistemological questions, both analytical and
empirical.' We were attracted to noneconomic compensatory dam-
ages as an object of inquiry for reasons related to our own research
interests. The American legal system has long claimed that all com-
pensatory damages, including noneconomic compensatory damages,
are matters of fact. We were puzzled as to what the "fact of the mat-
ter" of noneconomic damages might be, and thus interested in the im-
plications of such damages being "facts."'2 We were equally puzzled
by the constant refrain that juries have great discretion in finding
facts. 3 The courts in the nineteenth century tightly controlled jury
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co-authors, under the guidance of Professor Ronald J. Allen at Northwestern. We are indebted
to the participants of the Northwestern School of Law Faculty Workshop for comments on a
draft of this Article.
** Ph.D., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
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1. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Alexia Brunet, The Judicial Treatment of Non-economic Com-
pensatory Damages in the Nineteenth Century, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2007);
Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its Future
Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243 (2004); Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The
Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003).
2. See infra Part II.
3. Brad Snyder, Protecting the Media from Excessive Damages: The Nineteenth-Century Ori-
gins of Remittitur and Its Modern Application in Food Lion, 24 VT. L. REV. 299 (2000) (providing
an excellent review of cases expressing this opinion); see also Piotrowski v. Southworth Prods.
Corp., 15 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that damage determinations will not be reversed
by a reviewing court "except for a manifest abuse of discretion"); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of
Mountain Home v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1070 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that
appellate courts have an "extremely narrow" scope of review and "may not reverse except for a
manifest abuse of discretion"); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAM-
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factfinding, despite substantial political efforts to reduce the power of
their grip. 4 We found it implausible that courts would now relinquish
control over the critical determination of damages. Finally, we were
puzzled by the proposals for damage caps as a solution to the problem
of noneconomic compensatory damages; no plausible understanding
of noneconomic damages as facts would lead one to conclude that a
responsive reform would involve caps. If there is a problem with find-
ings of fact, whether by a judge or a jury, it lies in their inaccuracy-
not their excessiveness. For these reasons, we began a project that
resulted in this Article and a companion piece.5 Together, these arti-
cles examine the nature and means of regulating noneconomic com-
pensatory damages.
The puzzle can be summed up as follows: To us, a "fact" involves a
proposition with truth value that is either analytically or empirically
verifiable. Noneconomic compensatory damages either do or do not
involve facts with such attributes. If they do not, then they are analyt-
ically identical to punitive damages, and the constitutional regime
constructed by the Supreme Court to constrain punitive damages ap-
plies perforce to them.6 This seems clear.7 But if noneconomic com-
pensatory damages involve facts-in our sense of the word-then the
AGES 20 (New York, John S. Voorhies 3d ed. 1858) ("The quantum of damages being in most
cases intimately blended with the questions of fact, must have been from the outset generally left
with the jury.").
4. Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L. REV. 843 (1981);
Allen & Brunet, supra note 1.
5. Allen & Brunet, supra note 1.
6. Noneconomic compensatory damages are conventionally distinguished from punitive dam-
ages in that noneconomic compensatory damages involve factual determinations, while punitive
damages do not. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431
(2001) (holding that the appropriate standard of review applicable to punitive damage awards is
a de novo standard).
7. Jury instructions strongly suggest the similarity between noneconomic compensatory and
punitive damages. For example, according to the New York Pattern Jury Instructions, in a case
where damages for pain and suffering are at issue, juries are instructed in the following manner:
If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you may include in your
verdict an award for past and future pain and suffering. That award should include the
amount, if any, for the injuries suffered and for future pain and suffering. If you award
damages for future pain and suffering, that amount will be in one lump sum for the
entire future period. In addition, you will state the number of years for which the
award is made.
COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Ass'N OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, NEW YORK
PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 2:151A(1) (2006). It is clear that these instructions
carry no substantive content. If there is no substantive content, they also do not, as presently
administered, involve the rule of law, and as suggested by the Supreme Court in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell (which held that the process for assessing puni-
tive damages violated due process), any juridical event that departs from the rule of law violates
due process. 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
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Due Process Clause applies and mandates an accurate and reliable
determination of those facts, unless history speaks to the contrary.
The life of the law truly has been experience rather than logic, and a
long-standing practice can compromise the most rigorous analytical
implications. 8 The initial question is how the American legal system
historically treated noneconomic compensatory damages. In a com-
panion article, we present the results of an empirical inquiry into the
treatment of noneconomic compensatory damages by courts from the
founding of the country through the end of the nineteenth century.9
We found that, despite the constant refrain that juries have discretion
over damages, courts tightly controlled awards of noneconomic com-
pensatory damages. Large awards were uniformly reversed, and dam-
ages were compressed towards the mean. Additionally, there was
evidence of a strong, positive correlation between the size of the
award and the probability of reversal for cases awarding noneconomic
compensatory damages. Indeed, we could not find a single case af-
firmed on appeal that plausibly involved noneconomic compensatory
damages in which the total damages exceeded the modern equivalent
of $450,000.
This is significant for two reasons. First, the Seventh Amendment
could be viewed as imposing constraints on the review of jury verdicts
involving noneconomic compensatory damages, or limiting federal au-
thority over them in some other way.10 But our empirical data include
some of the earliest documented American tort cases; they provide
strong evidence for the proposition that judicial oversight of jury-de-
termined damage awards was in fact common, and they provide essen-
tially indisputable evidence as to what the founding generation and
judges in the nineteenth century believed the command of the "coin-
8. See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881); see, e.g.,
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989). The Court commented on its attempts to
define the Due Process Clause:
In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the Clause, we have insisted not
merely that the interest denominated as a "liberty" be "fundamental" (a concept that,
in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by
our society. As we have put it, the Due Process Clause affords only those protections
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal." Our cases reflect "continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history
[and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
9. See Allen & Brunet, supra note 1.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall,be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law.").
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mon law" to be.11 They were, after all, living it.1 2 Second, this long-
standing tradition of judicial oversight bears on the meaning of due
process. A critical component of due process analysis is the "tradi-
tions and conscience of our people, ' 13 which is best exemplified by
what people actually do. Thus, our empirical analysis suggests that
the Seventh Amendment does not bar regulation of noneconomic
11. The Supreme Court has suggested that a court should look to the status of the claim at
"common law" in order to determine whether the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
attaches in any given case. "Common law" refers to the laws of eighteenth-century England.
See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990). None-
theless, the Court has just as often wandered off that path. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Hu-
manities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Markman v..westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996);
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943). For a review of the complex history of the
Court's treatment of the issue, see RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH & EDWARD F.
SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 529-606 (4th ed. 2005). For a critical
comparison of what the Court has done to the English common law, see Suja A. Thomas, The
Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687
(2004). In any event, the best measure of what the common law meant to the founding genera-
tion was how they implemented it. See, e.g., Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process
Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231, 248
(2003).
12. There is a curious dispute in the civil procedure literature about the implications of the
Seventh Amendment for remittiturs, in particular as to what dollar amount the court should
actually remit the excessive damage award. The arguments center on either the minimum or
maximum amount a jury might have awarded, or "the amount the court itself believes should
have been awarded." MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra note 11, at 669. This Article sug-
gests another possibility, the one the nineteenth-century courts seemed to have followed: keep-
ing awards close to means and medians. The absence of empirical work like ours is what has led
distinguished commentators to suggest that the maximum recovery rule is the only one that "has
any reasonable claim of being consistent with the Seventh Amendment." Id. at 670 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY
KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815 (2d ed. 1995)). This is plainly contra-
dicted by what the courts did, regardless of what the opinions said. The same confusion is found
in numerous Supreme Court opinions. For example, dissenting in Gasperini, Justice John Paul
Stevens uttered the conventional legal dogma that "[c]ommon-law courts were hesitant to dis-
turb jury awards, but less so in cases in which 'a reasonably certain measure of damages is af-
forded."' 518 U.S. at 446 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 1 DAVID GRAHAM ET AL., A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF NEW TRIALS IN CASES CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 452 (2d ed. 1855) and George T.
Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law (pt. 1), 47 LAW Q. REV. 345, 363-64 (1931)).
Both points are false. First, throughout the nineteenth century, courts reversed jury verdicts at a
very steady rate of about 47%, which hardly constitutes a hesitancy to reverse. See Allen &
Brunet, supra note 1, tbi.4. Second, in cases involving noneconomic compensatory damages, the
reversal rate was approximately 50%, and in cases involving economic damages with no
noneconomic damages the reversal rate was about 51%, which does not demonstrate much of a
difference in the two sets. Id. Where one cannot tell from the opinion whether noneconomic
damages were awarded, the reversal rate was about 39%, but these cases simply do not deal with
damages, and thus do not pertain to the question Justice Stevens was addressing. Id. In addi-
tion, as the amount of noneconomic compensatory damages goes up, the probability of reversal
goes up to essentially 1.0. Id. fig.5. By contrast, there is no relationship between the amount of
economic damages and the rate of reversal. Id.
13. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
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compensatory damages, and supports the conclusion that the Due
Process Clause demands it.
Given these historical findings, we turned to modern case law and
the literature discussing the regulation of noneconomic compensatory
damages, including the wonderful symposium published in this jour-
nal. 14 From our external perspective, we predicted that the argument
over noneconomic compensatory damages would involve a straight-
forward articulation of the actual "facts" involved, coupled with an
analysis of which procedures would best promote accuracy in factfind-
ing. To our surprise, modern cases focus largely on the issues of exces-
siveness and comparability among verdicts; they offer no explanation
why either patrolling awards for excessiveness or ensuring compara-
bility is needed.' 5
The academic literature is similar in this way. Like case law, articles
focus on excessiveness and comparability without explaining why, ex-
cept in terms of economic disruption. 16 Other articles advocate abol-
ishing these damages because they are difficult to calculate1 7 and tend
14. Symposium, Who Feels Their Pain? The Challenge of Noneconomic Damages in Civil Liti-
gation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 249 (2006).
15. See, e.g., Tisdel v. Barber, 968 F. Supp. 957, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). There are many cases
that address a court's ability to look to comparable cases in determining whether a jury's damage
assessment is excessive. See, e.g., Scala v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 985 F.2d 680, 684 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("In determining whether a particular award is excessive, courts have reviewed awards
in other cases involving similar injuries, 'bearing in mind that any given judgment depends on a
unique set of facts and circumstances."' (quoting Nairn v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 837 F.2d
565, 568 (2d Cir. 1988))); Shaw v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Under the
law of Washington, awards are considered excessive only if the amount shocks the court's sense
of justice or sound judgment. The circumstances must indicate that the trial judge was swayed by
passion or prejudice. We make this determination by comparing the sum to other awards in
similar cases within the jurisdiction." (citation omitted)); Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d
1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1985); Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F.2d 311, 318 (5th Cir.
1984); Thompson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 827 (6th Cir. 1980); Morrow v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 541 F.2d 713, 722 (8th Cir. 1976).
16. See, e.g., DeCamp, supra note 11; see also David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Over-
sight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review
of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1115 (1995);
Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763,
777 (1995); JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and Comparability
Review, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 252 (2003); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Dam-
ages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 198 (2002) (discuss-
ing the potential for providing jurors with comparable verdicts to determine compensatory
damages); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of
Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 754-55 (1999); Roselle L. Wissler et al.,
Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases: Problems and Possibilities, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 712, 718 (2000).
17. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery
for Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359 (2006). In support of noneconomic damages, and
specifically pain and suffering awards, Professor Rabin emphasizes the importance of the "make-
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to vary substantially.1 8 Still others propose solutions to assessing
noneconomic damages, particularly damages for pain and suffering,' 9
ranging from providing various types of aid to jurors in determining
awards for pain and suffering, 20 to providing a mechanistic response to
whole" concept in tort law. But he also recognizes an inherent difficulty in assessing intangible
losses, rendering the "make-whole" principle a misplaced metric for awarding these damages.
Id. at 361-62; see also Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommen-
surable, and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (2006) (expos-
ing the inherently aberrant nature of any assessment of intangible damages, and discussing the
difficulty in calculability); Richard L. Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental
Loss?, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79 (1986) (discussing the utility of damages for pain and suffering,
arguing that money damages are inadequate, and suggesting that courts should cease to recog-
nize a cause of action in tort for merely accidental property damage); Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain
and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163 (2004)
(arguing, in the context of opposing noneconomic damages, that damages for pain and suffering
should be completely eliminated as recoverable); Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury:
The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1953, at 219. Citing the difficulty
inherent in placing a monetary value on pain and suffering, Professor King references Professor
Jaffe's article to expose the reality that "[t]he real problem is that suffering and money are
incommensurable." King, supra, at 178. King argues that "[plain and suffering damages and the
policy goals of modern tort law are conceptually and operationally incompatible," noting all the
while that pain and suffering simply cannot be "monetized and spread." Id. at 164, 178. He
presents a three-pronged proposal: the elimination of damages for pain and suffering, a broad
conception of economic damages to include comprehensive medical and rehabilitative treat-
ments to help alleviate pain and suffering, and the award of attorney's fees to prevailing plain-
tiffs in personal injury suits. Id. at 164-65.
18. AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, RAND INST., DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS:
WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and
Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989) (exposing varia-
tion in injury valuation even for similar or same injury); Corinne Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury
and Defendant Reprehensibility: Implications for Compensatory and Punitive Damage Awards,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189 (1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability
Cases: Systematic Compensation or Capricious Awards?, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (1988);
Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering
Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995); Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury
Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243 (1997); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic
Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037 (2004) (favoring
noneconomic compensatory damages, but arguing that hedonic damages should not exist as a
separate category of potential damages); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in
Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & Soc'v REV. 997 (1990);
Roselle L. Wissler et al., Explaining "Pain and Suffering" Awards: The Role of Injury Character-
istics and Fault Attributions, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 181 (1997).
19. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 18 (presenting a variety of methods for assessing pain and
suffering damages, all attempting to improve the accuracy and fairness of awards for
noneconomic damages, aiming to control the growth rate of these damages over time); see also
James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing Damages
for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 190 (1991) (providing a "solution" consistent with
the recommendations of this Article, advocating the creation of a "common law" for damages
using a reporting system that would have precedential effect for future awards, and proposing a
plan to pay for future services by "fund[ing] an insurance contract").
20. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 16, at 775-77 (cataloguing efforts to aid jurors in determining
awards for pain and suffering and citing two commissions, the ABA Action Commission to Im-
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limiting damages.21 Interestingly, one study comes close to advocating
that information be provided to juries to help them deliver more con-
sistent verdicts-just as judges did in the nineteenth century. But this
proposal does not make the connection between reliable factfinding
and due process that is at the heart of our argument. 22
To our knowledge, the literature nowhere recognizes the obvious: if
noneconomic compensatory damages involve facts, one must be able
to articulate and establish those facts in a reliable way. Indeed, it ap-
pears to us that the entire debate over noneconomic damages is pre-
mised on the unstated belief that there really is no fact of the matter
that allows for accurate determinations of the value of noneconomic
harms; the issue is either one of economics (e.g., whether verdicts put
industries out of business) or morality (e.g., whether "outrageous" be-
havior should be penalized under the guise of noneconomic compen-
satory damages). The only exception to this is the segment of the
academic literature that calls for legislative schedules or rigorous com-
parability review. These mechanisms create the fact of the matter,
thus resolving the dilemma. But legislative schedules and rigorous
comparability review are not just sensible policies; they, or some other
fact of the matter, are required before the assets of one person may be
transferred to another.
prove the Tort Liability System (ABA) and the ALI Reporters' Study on Enterprise Liability for
Personal Injury (ALI) designed to address this concern). The ABA Commission made three
proposals. First, the Commission urged that judges should make greater use of additur and
remittitur to "set aside verdicts that are 'clearly disproportionate to community expectations,'"
without advocating caps on damage awards. Id. at 775. Second, the Commission suggested that
"tort award commissions" be "established to gather and report information" on damage awards
for incorporation into jury instructions, for use in damage additur and remittitur review, and for
use in the settlement process. Id. Finally, the Commission suggested that methods should be
imposed to guide jurors in the assessment of damages, without making a specific proposal. Id.
The ALI Commission took a different approach by urging the "adoption of a floor or threshold"
of the severity of illness that must be met before an individual could receive damages for pain
and suffering in a particular case and recommending the adoption of "'meaningful guidelines' to
aid juries" in damage assessment. Id. at 776.
21. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of
the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 87 (2006)
(proposing a mathematical test designed to ease the difficulty inherent in assessing noneconomic
compensatory damages by adding an age-adjusted multiplier that would be assigned to the medi-
cal costs of the plaintiff in order to calculate the pain and suffering damages in an individual
case, and by allowing for an adjustment of this formula where justice so requires).
22. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 16, at 777 (proposing a solution to the "problem" of
noneconomic compensatory damages that parallels our recommendations). Professor Chase rec-
ommends providing jurors with a chart summarizing similar awards in cases of similarly situated
plaintiffs. Id. This chart would be available during deliberations, and attorneys could refer to it
during closing arguments. Id. Unlike our position, Chase urges that the information should not
be binding on jurors, but rather would provide a mechanism for juries to determine what consti-
tutes a "reasonable" award. Id.
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This literature is peculiar. It is, as Professor Joseph King suggests,
reminiscent of the classic story of The Emperor's New Clothes,23 in
that a vast debate has proceeded in complete disregard of a necessary
component. One would think that the first step in analyzing
noneconomic compensatory damages is to articulate what the fact of
the matter is. Without tying liability to facts, any form of "compensa-
tion" is simply an open-ended invitation to transfer wealth from one
person to another, which we need not defend for it would be both
inappropriate and unconstitutional. Imagine a statute that says, "Get
together a group of neighbors and transfer as much of the net worth of
Microsoft to one of your friends as you would like." It is not worth
discussing whether such a statute would be constitutional.
A defender of the status quo might retort, however, that there is a
fact of the matter-pain, or loss of companionship, or the like. We
agree, but the question is whether there is a fact of the matter of its
value. A simple example will make the point. Compare a pain and
suffering award to an award of expectational loss under a contract.
The legal wrongs are, in the first case, inflicting pain and suffering,
and in the second, violating the contract. Once a legal wrong is found,
the next step is to appraise the consequences. In the contract case, it
is a straightforward factfinding matter, although it may be difficult and
contested in individual cases. One looks to what the contract called
for and what the parties did and did not do, and then estimates the
real economic consequences of the relevant events. What, by compar-
ison, is the factfinding in the case of pain and suffering? The question
answers itself. Without a statutory or common-law articulation of the
fact of the matter, factfinders are left entirely to their own devices to
choose the amount of the award. Some jurors or judges will think that
loss of consortium is worth $10 a day, others $1000. So how can this
difference be bridged rationally? To emphasize the significance of this
point, imagine a statute that said, "Upon finding a breach of a con-
tract, award as much in damages as you like." Such a statute would be
laughed out of court; yet in the absence of a fact of the matter that is
reliably determined, that is precisely what factfinders do when they
award noneconomic compensatory damages.
This does not mean that awards for noneconomic harms could
never be provided. Indeed, the debate over comparability points to a
23. King, supra note 17, at 164 (citing HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSON, THE EMPEROR'S NEW
CLOTHES (1836), reprinted in THE COMPLETE FAIRYTALES AND STORIES 77 (Erik Christian Hau-
gaard trans., 1974)). In this tale, a young boy courageously revealed to the king that the suit he
(the king) was wearing was not made of priceless invisible thread, as he and his followers be-
lieved, but rather that he was standing before his kingdom with no clothes at all.
[Vol. 56:12491256
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solution to the dilemma of noneconomic compensatory damages that
reflects the judicial practices of the nineteenth century. During that
period, the fact of the matter of noneconomic compensatory damages
was community consensus as reflected in jury verdicts over time, just
as with negligence, and judges essentially kept damage results clus-
tered around the means and medians of jury findings in general.2 4
This was perfectly sensible. Juries are effective sampling mechanisms
that, like most statistical sampling mechanisms, generate results clus-
tering around the means and medians, with predictable outliers. But
if the fact of the matter of the value of noneconomic compensatory
damages is community consensus in the sense we use the term, exces-
siveness review and damage caps are not proper control mechanisms.
The problem is not that noneconomic damages might exceed some
arbitrary limit; the problem is that results will deviate from the means
and medians in any statistical sampling. The solution is not to put a
cap on overly excessive deviations from the norm, but to insist on ver-
dicts remaining close to the means and medians. The obvious correc-
tive mechanisms are either legislative schedules or rigorous
comparability review, although there may be other possibilities as
well. In other words, the solution to the problem is simply to create a
fact of the matter.25
Legislative schedules or damage tables involve something similar to
statutory compensation systems such as the workers' compensation
system. If the fact of the matter is community consensus over the
value of such things as pain and suffering, then legislatures are in the
best position to determine the appropriate value of such things. Dam-
age tables are modeled, in part, after sentencing guidelines used in the
states and "may prescribe for the jury either the exact amount of the
24. See Allen & Brunet, supra note 1. This is true of the contemporary meaning of negligence
as well. Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A
Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 683 (2002). To be clear, all we
mean by "consensus" here is the means and medians of the results of verdicts over time.
Whether there is such a thing as "community consensus" in any other sense is irrelevant to us.
Regardless of what any individual judge said or did, the activity of the nineteenth-century judges
can be characterized as treating jury verdicts as a statistical sampling problem in which devia-
tions from the norm largely, but not exclusively, go in one direction (higher). The judges elimi-
nated virtually all verdicts that went noticeably above the norm, and compressed damages on
both sides of the norm (including reversing cases that were too low, although that process is less
dramatic for obvious reasons). Thus, cases with noneconomic compensatory damages that were
affirmed had lower means and smaller standard deviations and semi-standard deviations (on
both sides of the mean) than cases that were reversed.
25. See DeCamp, supra note 11; Kathryn Zeiler, Medical Malpractice and Contract Disclosure:
An Equilibrium Model of the Effects of Legal Rules on Behavior in Health Care Markets (Ge-
orgetown University Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 539224 (2004)), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=539224 (offering mandatory disclosure as a way to curb pain and suffering damages).
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award for each subcategory or ... a range of permissible awards. '2 6
Damage tables define subcategories of comparable cases based on
things "such as injury severity level and the plaintiff's age."'27 Scaling
is another mechanism in which the court presents the jury with "upper
and lower dollar limits for different injury types. ' 28 Scaling differs
from damage tables in that juries are permitted to consider all of the
characteristics relevant to an assessment of the plaintiff's harm.29
Comparability review involves comparing the present case to deci-
sions rendered in similar cases. As attorney Paul DeCamp notes, this
approach originated in a 1758 decision, Wilford v. Berkeley,30 and con-
tinued through Goldsmith v. Lord Sefton31 in 1796, Blunt v. Little32 in
1822, Clapp v. Hudson River Rail Road33 in 1854, and Murray v. Hud-
son River Railroad34 in 1871. Currently, comparability review finds
some support in the courts;35 interestingly, some case law suggests that
parties may have a right to present evidence of comparable cases to
juries.36
Both comparability review and legislative tables can capture com-
munity consensus in the way we use the term, and thus ensure that
noneconomic compensatory damages may be reliably determined.
We suggest that some such mechanism-or some other alternative
that articulates the fact of the matter and permits reliable factfind-
ing-is constitutionally required. It should be clear, though, that our
point is distinct from current comparability review, which determines
whether a particular damage award reflects passion or prejudice or
26. Baldus et al., supra note 16, at 1124.
27. Id. at 1123-24.
28. Id. at 1123.
29. Id.; see also Bovbjerg et al., supra note 18. Obviously, legislative determination of dam-
ages may pose its own due process issues. See Blaine Evanson, Due Process in Statutory Dam-
ages, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 601 (2005).
30. 1 Burr. 609, 97 Eng. Rep. 472 (K.B. 1758) (cited in DeCamp, supra note 11, at 248).
31. 3 Anst. 808, 145 Eng. Rep. 1046 (Ex. 1796) (cited in DeCamp, supra note 11, at 248).
32. 3 F. Cas. 760 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578) (cited in DeCamp, supra note 11, at 248).
33. 19 Barb. 461 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1854) (cited in DeCamp, supra note 11, at 248).
34. 47 Barb. 196 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1866), affd, 48 N.Y. 655 (1871) (cited in DeCamp, supra
note 11, at 248).
35. There are many cases that address a court's ability to look to comparable cases in deter-
mining whether or not a jury damage assessment is excessive. See, e.g., supra note 15. But it
seems that the idea of giving this information directly to the jury is more of an academic con-
struct at the present time. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 16, at 777; DeCamp, supra note 11, at
292-94; Wissler et al., supra note 16, at 754-55, 816-17.
36. See, e.g., Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001) ("To minimize
the arbitrary variance in awards bound to result from such a throw-up-the-hands approach, the
trier of fact should, as is done routinely in England, be informed of the amounts of pain and
suffering damages awarded in similar cases." (citations omitted)). We think it is more than good
policy; it is actually constitutionally required.
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"shock[s] the conscience. '37 Again, notwithstanding its currency, the
problem does not manifest itself in shocking verdicts; the problem
manifests itself in a lack of accurate factfinding, of which shockingly
high or low verdicts are just a part.
These points, taken together with the findings discussed in our com-
panion article, demonstrate that the Seventh Amendment allows, and
the Due Process Clause demands, limits on noneconomic compensa-
tory damages by requiring an articulation of the verifiable facts upon
which liability rests.38 Judges in the nineteenth century kept damages
remarkably constrained, and due process requires accurate factfind-
ing, which a fortiori requires a fact to find. All of this seems straight-
forward to us, but as the symposium in the DePaul Law Review and
an avalanche of other writing demonstrates, our view is apparently not
shared by a large portion of the legal system or academia. Perhaps
our outsider perspective blinds us to subtle aspects of the problem.
We can think of two possible attacks on the logic of our position.
First, perhaps we are taking too simplistic a view of what a "fact" is.
Maybe a "fact," for purposes of the Seventh Amendment, means
something other than a proposition with truth value, and thus entails
significantly unconstrained reallocation of wealth by judges or juries.
Second, perhaps the Due Process Clause is less concerned about fac-
tual accuracy than we naively assume. The remainder of this Article
addresses these two points.
We proceed first to an analytical and historical discussion of the
nature of "facts" and of noneconomic compensatory damages. We
then examine the relationship between due process and accurate out-
comes. These two analyses solidify rather than threaten the founda-
tions of our logic. "Facts," from the founding era through the
nineteenth century, meant precisely what the term means in conven-
tional discourse today: verifiable propositions with truth value.
Moreover, the evidence makes clear that the deepest and most funda-
mental value of the Due Process Clause has historically been factual
accuracy, which is pursued, to be sure, through procedures ancillary to
that result.
The Emperor, then, really has no clothes. Permitting noneconomic
compensatory damages in the absence of a clearly articulated fact of
the matter established by reliable evidence is nothing more than an
open invitation to judges or jurors to transfer the assets of one party
37. See, e.g., Tisdel v. Barber, 968 F. Supp. 957, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See generally DeCamp,
supra note 11.
38. Congress could impose a solution under the Commerce Clause, as briefly discussed infra
Part IV.
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to another. This is the antithesis of the rule of law. If compensation
for noneconomic harms is to be allowed in a manner consistent with
our deepest commitments, someone-judges or legislators-will need
to articulate the fact of the matter that permits specific recoveries.
II. NONECONOMIC COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AS FACTS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS. THEREOF
The law in the United States has uniformly claimed that the deter-
mination of compensatory damages involves factfinding.39 It is clear
that damages for which there is an economic measure, such as ex-
pectational loss under a contract, involve factfinding. The expecta-
tions of the parties are plainly facts, as are both their behavior and
contractual language. The actual loss incurred might be difficult to
determine from time to time, as it may involve ambiguities like price
estimates and the parties' subjective expectations and assumptions,
but reasonable ranges can be readily determined. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that a party breaches a contract to sell a herd of cattle that was to
be fattened and taken to market. A host of ambiguous questions sur-
round the determination of the cost of the breach: How many of the
cattle would have died before being delivered to market? How would
they have fattened up? No one can give precise answers to
coiinterfactual questions like these, and that is why the law has also
uniformly claimed that juries have "discretion" in the determination
of damages. Discretion, however, is a misnomer. What discretion re-
ally means is that the inability to make a highly precise calculation of
39. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) ("A
jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination,
whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation."); St.
Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 661 (1915); Trull v. Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 320 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Translating legal damage into money damages is a
matter 'peculiarly within a jury's ken,' especially in cases involving intangible, non-economic
losses."); Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 475 (Or. 1999) ("The determination of dam-
ages in a personal injury case is a question of fact."); RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCnONS
ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 3.01[1] (5th ed. 2003) ("The determination of the amount to
be awarded for compensatory damages is a matter resting primarily in the discretion of the jury,
in that it involves the credibility of witnesses and the weight and value to be given their testi-
mony on a fact issue."). Again, if noneconomic compensatory damages are not facts, they
should be treated as punitive damages and could constitute due process violations. In this Arti-
cle, we assume that, as the courts have held, compensatory damages are factual determinations
for the jury.
To our knowledge, the only potential recognition of the problems posed by noneconomic com-
pensatory damages is in a concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Harry Blackmun: "Ar-
guably, damages for pain and suffering are themselves not truly compensatory. Certainly, such
awards are of a different character. They are inherently noneconomic and are established
through the subjective discretion of the jury." Monessen S.W. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330,
348 n.5 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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the loss caused by a party will not insulate that party from liability for
its actions. Factfinders thus have discretion in estimating plausible
consequences of the parties' actions.
The nature of this factfinding, and thus what constitutes a "fact," is
obvious. A disinterested factfinder hears evidence of real and
counterfactual states of the universe-of matters external to the mind
of the factfinder itself-and approximates the way that the universe
was "in fact." The ontology here is naive realism coupled with a
straightforward understanding of counterfactuals operating within a
correspondence theory of truth. What this means is that the legal sys-
tem operates on the assumption that there is an external world capa-
ble of being known through observation, and that we can approximate
the effects that causal variables have on that world.
There are various esoteric theoretical perspectives on "facts" and
the "real world" but, as far as we can tell, none of them have signifi-
cantly influenced the structure of the legal system or any of its precur-
sors.40 Under the Roman canon system, a precursor to English
common law, a "fact" entailed a human action or event even if that
event was not directly observed.41 This early conception of a "fact,"
as something separate and apart from the subjective notions of the
factfinder, leads directly to the common understanding of the concept
in the formative era of the United States.
Professor Barbara Shapiro's erudite historical examination of jury
factfinding in seventeenth-century through nineteenth-century En-
gland reaches the unsurprising conclusion, among many others, that
"[j]uries . .. arrived at findings of fact guided by common sense and
common knowledge, ' 42 which entail the world being independent of
the mind. Moreover, as the complexity of cases increased and juror
familiarity with the facts of a particular case decreased, jurors began
to rely on witnesses and documents, evaluating that information for
both "truthfulness and accuracy. '43 In order to evaluate information
for truthfulness and accuracy, the information must be either true or
false, accurate or inaccurate. Those judgments, in turn, can be ren-
dered only if the information exists and a juror can bring knowledge
to bear upon those determinations of truthfulness and accuracy. "In-
40. This is not surprising, as it would be difficult to operate a legal system in thrall to skeptical
theories of knowledge.
41. BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, A CULTURE OF FACT: ENGLAND, 1550-1720 (2000).
42. Barbara J. Shapiro, "To a Moral Certainty": Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American
Juries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 155 (1986). Although Shapiro focuses on criminal law
matters, she nevertheless provides useful insight and background into the philosophical and legal
thinking about jury factfinding in common-law England.
43. Id. at 155-56.
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formation" that exists only in the mind of the factfinder is incapable of
being accurate or true.
Shapiro also discusses the language employed in English cases from
1700 to 1750, demonstrating that references to "conscience" in jury
decisionmaking became more rare over time,44 and instead "[tihe
most common directives employed 'belief' based on evidence. '45 In
the latter half of the eighteenth century, the language became even
more secularized, replacing the word "believe" with "think," 46 which
emphasizes that jurors find "facts" that exist in the real world and not
in the confines of their subjective understandings. An eighteenth-cen-
tury American legal scholar stated that although legal proceedings
"'must judge on probability,' nothing less than the 'highest degree of
probability must govern' the courts."'47 Shapiro summarized the eight-
eenth-century understanding:
When one had reached a judgment based on "the honesty and in-
tegrity of credible and disinterested witnesses" the mind had no
choice but to "acquiesce therein as if a knowledge by demonstra-
tion." The mind "ought not any longer to doubt but, to be nearly if
not as perfectly well-satisfied as if we of ourselves knew the fact."' 48
The decision, in other words, should correspond as closely as possible
to the external reality to which it refers.
Perhaps most telling is the definition of the term "fact" from Sa-
muel Johnson's 1773 A Dictionary of the English Language, published
just prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776:
"1. A thing done; an effect produced; something not barely supposed
or suspected, but really done. 2. Reality; not supposition; not specula-
tion. 3. Action; deed."' 49 Parsing this definition makes it readily ap-
parent that, at the time of the Framers, a "fact" was something that
existed independent from the mind of an individual. "Facts" are con-
cerned with an objective reality and not with a subjective state of
mind.50
44. Id. at 168.
45. Id. & n.50 (citing a variety of eighteenth-century English cases).
46. Id. at 169.
47. Id. at 177 (quoting 1 JOHN MORGAN, ESSAYS UPON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (London
1789)).
48. Shapiro, supra note 42, at 177 (quoting MORGAN, supra note 47).
49. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 705-06 (4th ed. 1773);
accord JOSEPH TOWERS, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE QUESTION, WHETHER JURIES ARE, OR ARE
NOT, JUDGES OF LAW, AS WELL AS OF FACT; WITH A PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CASE OF
LIBELS (1764).
50. For those who are not fluent in these epistemological discussions, there can plainly be
facts about the mind, such as whether a person intended or knew something. Our point is that a
"fact" in conventional discourse requires a correspondence between the belief of a person and a
real state, not just a subjective opinion about whatever the matter in question happens to be.
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This conventional understanding of a "fact" as something that exists
in reality is common throughout legal materials of the nineteenth cen-
tury. An 1854 legal dictionary defines "fact" as "[a]n action; a thing
done." 51 An 1873 treatise entitled A Treatise on Facts as Subjects of
Inquiry by a Jury5 2 defined the word "fact" in the following manner:
If a thing be perceived by any sense of the body or faculty of the
mind, the perception is a fact. If any thing is seen or heard, the
seeing or hearing of it is a fact. If any emotion of the mind is felt, as
joy, grief, anger, the feeling of it is a fact. If the operation of the
mind is productive of an effect, as intention, knowledge, skill, the
possession of this effect is a fact. If any proposition be true,
whatever is affirmed or denied in it is a fact. A. said this or that, or
did this or that: if these propositions be true, then that A. did so say
or did so do, is a fact. 53
In another treatise on trial by jury, John Proffatt discussed the dif-
ference between law and fact as understood in 1877, stating that
"[f]acts must precede law; for law governs them in their relation or
effect."'54 For facts to be able to "precede" anything, they must first
exist and be independent of subjective states of mind. Finally, in his
treatise discussing the difference between questions of law and fact,
J.C. Wells stated that juries look to evidence for facts.55
51. 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 506 (Philadelphia, Childs & Peterson 10th ed.
1860).
52. JAMES RAM, A TREATISE ON FACTS AS SUBJECTS OF INQUIRY BY A JURY (Fred B. Roth-
man & Co. 1982) (1873).
53. Id. at 17-19.
54. JOHN PROFFATr, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF LAW AND
FACT, WITH AN INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER ON THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF JURY TRIAL 319
(1877). Another nineteenth-century scholar discussed two types of reasoning: the demonstra-
tive and the moral. This scholar relied on a "'common sense school,' which would dominate
Anglo-American epistemological discussion and moral philosophy in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries." Shapiro, supra note 42, at 178. Moral evidence dealt with "real but
contingent truths and connections which take place among things actually existing." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 505, 518 (James DeWitt An-
drews ed., 1896). This is, of course, exactly our point-facts were believed to actually exist in the
real world.
55. J.C. WELLS, A TREATISE ON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES
AND BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS 10 (Des Moines, Mills & Co. rev. ed. 1879). The modern cases em-
brace the notion that a "fact" is something external to the mind of the observer, which is not
surprising as just about everybody so employs the concept. For example, in In re Silicon Graph-
ics Inc. Securities Litigation, the Ninth Circuit defined "fact" as "an 'event or circumstance,' or 'a
truth known by actual experience or observation."' 183 F.3d 970, 983-84 (9th Cir. 1999) (quot-
ing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 591 (6th ed. 1990) and THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTION-
ARY 473 (rev. ed. 1980)). An Eleventh Circuit case similarly defined a fact as something that
must exist independent of the mind of the observer: "A factual proposition is typically some-
thing capable in principle of falsification (or possibly even verification) by some empirical in-
quiry .... " Johnson v. United States, 340 F.3d 1219, 1223 (11th Cir. 2003). Something that is
capable of falsification or verification must exist independent of the mind of the observer, for it
must be available to be falsified or verified. John Wigmore also expressed the opinion that a fact
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It may seem that we are grappling to prove an obvious point from
which no one in the legal system would dissent-that "facts" entail an
external world and that the job of the factfinder is to find those facts
accurately. Noneconomic compensatory damages are also facts, ac-
cording to the universal view, but what constitutes the fact of the mat-
ter? Take pain and suffering as an example. There are plainly some
facts of the matter in many instances; for example, whether a third
degree burn is more painful than a battery involving little more than
an unwanted push. What is each injury worth? One may be worth
more than the other, but an absolute rather than a relative scale is
needed. That scale, in turn, must be determined by objective evidence
that can be processed and evaluated to generate a true answer, an
answer that gets the state of the universe right. The value of pain
cannot be defined by a factfinder's subjective belief. That is the exact
opposite of what it means to be a "fact." Discretion here can mean
only that there is some play in the joints, not that the "facts" are not
what actually happened in the real world, but instead are simply what
reside in the brains of factfinders. To conclude that the "facts" are
simply what factfinders believe, rather than assessments of truth about
matters external to the minds of factfinders, would eliminate the rule
of law.
Eliminating the rule of law, however, would violate due process.
We now have another commonplace observation to establish: the cen-
tral concern of the Due Process Clause is factual accuracy. As with
the definition of a "fact," this is something that is universally believed
but not always clearly spoken. Nonetheless, it is true.
Il. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND FACTUAL ACCURACY
A. The Cases
There is a misconception in American legal scholarship that the fun-
damental political insight of the Enlightenment, and the strongest
is something external to a mind in his evidence law textbook, stating that "[a] fact is any event or
act or condition of things, assumed (for the moment) as happening or existing." JOHN H. Wio-
MORE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 7 (1935) (emphasis omitted). For a
fact to be an act or condition of things, and for a fact to be assumed to exist, it must, at least for
the moment, exist somewhere outside of the mind of the juror or perceiver. Examples could be
proliferated endlessly. In addition, case law from the same time period reinforces the point that
damages are factual determinations to be assessed by a jury. One 1797 case states that "it will be
agreed to be a general and favorite practice, to allot the assessment of damages to a jury."
Brown v. Van Braam, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 344, 349 (1797). Another case states that "nothing is
better settled than that, in such cases as the present, and other actions for torts where no precise
rule of law fixes the recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function of the jury to determine the
amount by their verdict." Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886).
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plank supporting modern Western governments, has something to do
with rights and obligations. The abundant citations to Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau underscore this point. While rights and obligations are
important, the truly fundamental insight of the Enlightenment is that
there is a world external to our minds that may be known through
objective evidence. But citations to the epistemological work of
Locke, Berkley, Hume, and Kant for this proposition are few and far
between. 56 This reverses the actual relationship of facts and rights or
obligations; facts are prior to and determinative of rights and obliga-
tions. Without accurate factfinding, rights and obligations are mean-
ingless. Consider the simple case of ownership of the clothes you, the
reader, are wearing as you read this. Your ownership of those clothes
allows you the "right" to possess, consume, and dispose of those as-
sets, but suppose we approach and demand that you return "our"
clothes. You will appeal to a decisionmaker to whom you will present
evidence that you bought, made, found, or were given the clothes in
question, and, if successful, the decisionmaker will accord you those
rights and impose upon us reciprocal obligations. The key point,
though, is that those rights and obligations are dependent upon what
facts are found and are derivative of them. The significance of this
point cannot be overstated. Tying the rule of law to truth about the
real world anchors rights and obligations in things that can be known
and are independent of whim and caprice.
The Framers of the Constitution knew the importance of this; they
embraced it and adopted it in various provisions of the Constitution-
the most important of which is the Due Process Clause.57 The Court's
most definitive reading of the Due Process Clause is in Mathews v.
Eldridge,58 where it concluded that whether a particular procedure vi-
olated due process involved a balancing of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of ad-
ditional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail.59
56. For an excellent-although brief-review, see Crane Brinton, Enlightenment, in 1 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 519 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) and Shapiro, supra note 42.
57. The Takings Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause are other examples of the importance of
tying legal outcomes to the real-world state of events.
58. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
59. id. at 335.
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A deprivation can be erroneous only if it is based on inaccurate
factfinding. 60 Thus, scholars have recognized that the Mathews test is
essentially concerned with accuracy,61 and have even coined it the "ac-
curacy approach. '62 In an influential article, Professors Martin Red-
ish and Lawrence Marshall concluded that the Supreme Court focuses
almost "exclusively on instrumental concerns, '63  and that
"[a]ccording to the instrumental conception of due process, the pur-
pose of the clause is to ensure the most accurate decision possible. 64
In City of Los Angeles v. David, the Court said that "[t]he second
Eldridge factor [is a] concern for accuracy. '65
Even when the Court is not directly stating that factual accuracy is
the central concern of due process, a multitude of cases boil down to a
concern for accurate outcomes. We have been unable to identify any
significant set of cases extolling the virtues of some competitor that is
not reducible to accuracy. For example, Fuentes v. Shevin involved
the constitutionality of statutes authorizing the summary seizure of
personal property by a writ of replevin without providing a hearing.66
The Court, however, underscored the importance of such a hearing:
The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of
government to follow a fair process of decisionmaking when it acts
to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this require-
ment is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its
purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of
property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize substantively
unfair or mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that is espe-
cially great when the State seizes goods simply upon the application
of and for the benefit of a private party. 67
A deprivation of property is "mistaken" if that deprivation is wrong
on the facts; there is simply no other meaning that can be ascribed to
such a statement.
In his concurrence in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, Jus-
tice Harry Blackmun stated that "[p]rocedural due process seeks to
60. One might object that an erroneous application of the law to the facts is equally obnox-
ious, but an erroneous application of the law means that the law requires certain facts to be true
that are not. At the end of the day, it all comes back to accurate factfinding.
61. See, e.g., Harvey Rochman, Note, Due Process: Accuracy or Opportunity?, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2705, 2732 (1992).
62. Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of "Some Evidence," 25 SAN DIEoO
L. REV. 631, 699 (1988).
63. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 476 (1986).
64. Id.
65. 538 U.S. 715, 718 (2003).
66. 407 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1972).
67. Id. at 80-81 (emphasis added).
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ensure the accurate determination of decisional facts. '68 Decisional
facts are, of course, those facts that will directly affect the outcome;
accuracy in the determination of decisional facts must correspond to
accuracy in the final outcome. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Ser-
vices, the Court analyzed accuracy in the context of a parental rights
proceeding:
A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to
terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding
one.
. . . If, as our adversary system presupposes, accurate and just
results are most likely to be obtained through the equal contest of
opposed interests, the State's interest in the child's welfare may per-
haps best be served by a hearing in which both the parent and the
State acting for the child are represented by counsel, without whom
the contest of interests may become unwholesomely unequal. 69
The Supreme Court has also distinguished between the value of ac-
curacy and the value of a favorable result, pointing out that accuracy
dominates. In Heller v. Doe, the Court stated that "[a]t least to the
extent protected by the Due Process Clause, the interest of a person
subject to governmental action is in the accurate determination of the
matters before the court, not in a result more favorable to him."'70
Heller is interesting for another reason. The issue before the Court
was determining the standards for committing mentally retarded and
mentally ill persons to institutions, and whether family members and
legal guardians could intervene in commitment proceedings: "So long
as the accuracy of the adjudication is unaffected ... the Due Process
Clause does not prevent a State from allowing the intervention of im-
mediate family members and legal guardians . . . . Neither respon-
dents nor their amici have suggested that accuracy would suffer from
the intervention allowed by Kentucky law .... "71 One can see the
right to intervene in the commitment of a family member as a matter
of fundamental fairness, but the Court understood fundamental fair-
ness to consist most importantly of accurate adjudication.72
68. 447 U.S. 773, 797 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
69. 452 U.S. 18, 27-28 (1981).
70. 509 U.S. 312, 332 (1993).
71. Id. at 332-33.
72. Justice William Rehnquist made a similar suggestion in his dissent in Santosky v. Kramer,
involving a challenge to the "fair preponderance" of the evidence standard of proof applicable in
New York parental termination proceedings. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In a footnote, Justice Rehn-
quist points out that, although the standard cannot escape due process scrutiny based simply on
other procedures in place to ensure overall accuracy in the proceeding, it is constitutionally rele-
vant that "additional assurances of accuracy attend the application of the standard in New York
termination proceedings." Id. at 785 n.12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This suggests that these
additional guarantees of accuracy, though they would not insulate a particular practice from a
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In addition to the cases that explicitly use language of "accuracy"
when analyzing due process claims, there are a number of cases that
employ "arbitrary deprivation" of property interests as synonymous
with the basic concern for accurate outcomes. In discussing the "arbi-
trary deprivation" of life, liberty, or property, courts refer to the im-
portance of the interest at issue and. the degree of harm such
deprivation would cause. At the heart of this reasoning, however, is
the idea that a deprivation is arbitrary if it lacks a reasonable basis-
that is, if it lacks accuracy. The concern with potentially arbitrary or
inaccurate deprivations of property pervades modern jurisprudence.
The crucial point is that the concern about arbitrary outcomes can be
reduced to a desire to ensure accurate outcomes. 73
In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, for example,
the Court found that a civil forfeiture statute that allowed for an "ex
parte seizure . . . creat[ed] an unacceptable risk of error" notwith-
standing the important issues at stake:74
Although Congress designed the drug forfeiture statute to be a
powerful instrument in enforcement of the drug laws, it did not in-
tend to deprive innocent owners of their property. The affirmative
defense of innocent ownership is allowed by statute.
The ex parte preseizure proceeding affords little or no protection
to the innocent owner.75
In Connecticut v. Doehr, the Court held that a statute allowing at-
tachment to satisfy an impending judgment before the resolution of
due process challenge, would nevertheless decrease the likelihood of success of such a challenge.
This is yet another example indicating that the central tenet of due process is a guarantee of
factual accuracy.
73. Perhaps the earliest example of the Supreme Court's concern with arbitrary deprivation of
property dates back to the Marshall Court. The landmark decision in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810), held that a conveyance of land that occurred under a legislative act procured
by fraud is nevertheless a valid conveyance and is protected by the Contract Clause. Justice John
Marshall wrote the opinion for the Court:
Conveyances have been made, those conveyances have vested legal estates, and, if
those estates may be seized by the sovereign authority, still, that they originally vested
is a fact, and cannot cease to be a fact.
When, then, a law is in its nature a contract, when absolute rights have vested under
that contract, a repeal of the law cannot devest those rights ....
Id. at 135. Justice Marshall went on to conclude that the land grant at issue was, in fact, a
contract, and thus was protected by the Contract Clause. The Supreme Court has subsequently
cited to Fletcher for the proposition that the Contract Clause prevents states from regulating
contracts between private parties. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17
(1977). The holding in Fletcher demonstrates the value the early Supreme Court placed on cur-
tailing the arbitrary deprivation of these interests, and it also demonstrates that what the Court
meant by an arbitrary deprivation was a disregard of the actual facts. Reconsider, in this light,
our hypothetical statutes permitting citizens to reallocate wealth.
74. 510 U.S. 43, 55 (1993).
75. Id. (citation omitted).
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the case similarly created an insurmountable risk of erroneous depri-
vation.76 Although the statute was ambiguous, the Court concluded
that it was unconstitutional under any reading:
We need not resolve this confusion since the statute presents too
great a risk of erroneous deprivation under any of these interpreta-
tions. If the statute demands inquiry into the sufficiency of the com-
plaint, or, still less, the plaintiff's good-faith belief that the
complaint is sufficient, requirement of a complaint and a factual af-
fidavit would permit a court to make these minimal determinations.
But neither inquiry adequately reduces the risk of erroneous depri-
vation. Permitting a court to authorize attachment merely because
the plaintiff believes the defendant is liable, or because the plaintiff
can make out a facially valid complaint, would permit the depriva-
tion of the defendant's property when the claim would fail to con-
vince a jury, when it rested on factual allegations that were
sufficient to state a cause of action but which the defendant would
dispute, or in the case of a mere good-faith standard, even when the
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The potential for unwarranted attachment in these situations is self-
evident and too great to satisfy the requirements of due process ab-
sent any countervailing consideration. 77
In sum, the cases emphasizing the importance of accuracy are le-
gion; they compel the conclusion that the central concern of the Due
76. 501 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1991).
77. Id. at 13-14. The lower courts have taken their cue from the Supreme Court, and a large
number of cases recognize the fundamental importance of accuracy. In Davis v. Page, the court
held that the Florida statute at issue has various provisions that are "designed to ensure a correct
decision." 714 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the fact that an
inaccurate determination could render the statute unconstitutional for failing to provide due
process of law, but held that the procedures in place eviscerated this concern. Id. at 516-17. In
another case, the Eleventh Circuit examined a condemnation and resulting eviction under an
Orlando ordinance. Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1227 (11th Cir. 2003). Although the
court determined that the risk of erroneous deprivation was low, it nevertheless discussed the
fact that a condemnation and resulting eviction could be erroneous if "a code enforcement of-
ficer .. .evicts tenants from a building that actually is fit for human occupancy." Id. at 1234.
This court interpreted the second prong in the Mathews balancing test as condemning any depri-
vation of property that is inaccurate, and admitted that, if the code allowed the enforcement
officer to falsely evict tenants, it would be problematic from a due process perspective. The D.C.
Circuit engaged in a similar type of analysis in the context of the termination of teachers due to
low rankings in routine evaluations. These rankings included objective facts such as length of
service, whether the teacher is a district resident, and the principal's subjective rankings. Wash.
Teachers' Union Local No. 6, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. of D.C., 109 F.3d 774,
780-81 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Although the court eventually determined that the risk of erroneous
rankings was small, such rankings could have amounted to a due process violation were the risk
more significant. Id. The Union argued "that factual errors, such as attributing disciplinary
proceedings to the wrong teachers, could produce erroneous terminations." Id. at 780. The D.C.
Circuit determined that this risk was low, and thus it did not weigh heavily in the Mathews
balance. The court did acknowledge that, were these errors more prevalent, or if the risk of such
errors was significant, the result would have been different. There are endless examples.
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Process Clause is factual accuracy. There are other values but, as far
as we can tell, they pale in significance to factual accuracy. 78
B. The Scholars
A veritable mountain of scholarship concerning the Due Process
Clauses exists, but most of it is orthogonal to our concern. It is largely
normative, whereas our concern is about the fact of the matter and
how the Due Process Clause relates to factual accuracy. Nonetheless,
the pull of factual accuracy, even if not explicitly recognized by the
scholars themselves, exerts an enormous influence on this literature.
The writings of Professor Jerry Mashaw exemplify our point.
Mashaw equates accuracy with fairness and highlights its impor-
tance. 79 In his analysis of due process and social welfare claims,80
Mashaw argues that social welfare adjudications require accurate de-
terminations to produce a minimally sufficient level of fairness. Yet
accuracy is a "substantive ideal; [it is] approachable but never fully
attainable." 8' Where accuracy is unattainable, consistency in adjudi-
cation is required. Consistency in adjudication, however, is impossible
unless the adjudication is accurate, as its demand is to treat like cases
alike. What makes cases alike, of course, are their constituent facts.
78. Professor Lawrence Solum marshals the data indicating that values other than accuracy
matter to due process. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183-84
(2004). The strongest case that Solum identifies as resting on some other value is Richards v.
Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996), where the Court determined that due process was violated
by an Alabama rule giving claim-preclusive effect to a prior judgment in which the adversely
affected party was not represented. Solum points out that the Court did not engage in Mathews
interest balancing, but plainly the case is of that mold. Solum, supra, at 255-56. A contrary
ruling would have permitted wide-ranging preclusion rules disenfranchising interested parties
from protecting their interests. Even if this violates a participatory norm, it also will tend to be
truth defeating. To be clear, we do not assert that there are not any other values, but only that
truth determination is overwhelmingly important, and the weakness of the data supporting argu-
ment in favor of other values as central to due process tends to confirm our point.
79. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation
Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timelines in the Adjudication of Social Welfare
Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 775 (1974).
80. Id.; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary The-
ory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886 (1981). Mashaw contends that due process of law ought to vindi-
cate an individual's right to participate in those decisions that affect that person in important
ways without necessitating any sort of positive entitlement. This runs contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth, the Court held that
where a state seeks to bar an individual from public employment, makes a charge of "dishon-
esty," or attaches a "stigma" to an employment decision, it must afford due process when mak-
ing that determination. Id. at 573. Though Mashaw does not make the "accuracy" point as
forcefully, plainly a litigant's participation in decisions affecting that person in important ways
affects the accuracy of the outcome.
81. Mashaw, supra note 79, at 774-75.
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There is substantial discussion in the academic literature of due pro-
cess as freedom from arbitrary power. 82 The mention of arbitrary
power is instructive; it is yet another way in which authors refer to the
importance of accuracy in adjudication. The American Heritage Dic-
tionary defines "arbitrary" as "[d]etermined by chance, whim, or im-
pulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle. ' 83 Something that is
determined by chance, whim, or impulse is precisely something that is
not grounded in the world external to the mind of the deci-
sionmaker-in other words, in the facts. Rather, that which is arbi-
trary is unpredictable and variable, and the authors who discuss due
process as guaranteeing freedom from arbitrary adjudication are nec-
essarily concerned with accuracy. At times this is explicit, as with the
scholar who refers to due process protections from arbitrariness as
those necessary to ensure a "correct outcome. '84 Another notable
constitutional scholar, William Van Alstyne, argues that "freedom
from arbitrary adjudicative procedures [should be] a substantive ele-
ment of one's liberty. ' 85 Freedom from arbitrary adjudication means,
most fundamentally, accurate adjudication.
In the wake of Mathews, numerous scholars have articulated accu-
racy as the central component of due process. We have already men-
tioned the description of Mathews as "the accuracy approach,"8 6
which is echoed throughout the literature.87 Perhaps the strongest
recognition of the value of accuracy comes from Redish and Mar-
shall's magisterial review of the interests that inform due process adju-
dication. Their central claim is that the key command of due process
is an independent adjudicator, without which the protections of the
Due Process Clause are illusory.88 Underlying their argument, and
underlying all arguments about rights and obligations, is a concern
about factually accurate outcomes. Redish and Marshall exhaustively
analyze both "instrumental" and "noninstrumental" conceptions of
due process. They demonstrate that all but one of the supposedly
noninstrumental conceptions of due process relate directly to factually
accurate outcomes (the exception being the demand that justice
82. T.M. Scanlon, Due Process, in DUE PROCESS: NoMos XVIII 93, 97 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1977). This issue of Nomos was the result of a flurry of publication
centering on the requirements of due process.
83. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 91 (4th ed. 2000).
84. Scanlon, supra note 82, at 100.
85. William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 487 (1977) (emphasis omitted).
86. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Rochman, supra note 61, at 2732.
88. Redish & Marshall, supra note 63, at 457.
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should meet the appearance of justice). 89 They further argue that the
presence of an independent adjudicator is the best insurance that out-
comes will be sufficiently accurate so as to not violate a litigant's due
process rights.
Not surprisingly, a few scholars argue that due process is not just
about the outcome of a particular case, but also about process. 90 Pro-
fessor Robert Summers's seminal piece on "process values" argued
that a process can be good in itself, even if the results it produces are
not "good"; one goal of due process is good process itself, regardless
of outcome. 91 This is not to say that Summers is not interested in
outcomes, but rather that he and like-minded scholars value process
itself as an integral aspect of according a litigant due process rights.
As noted above, Redish and Marshall substantially reorient this argu-
ment by demonstrating that the concerns underlying the supposed
process values involve factual accuracy in all cases but one. Similarly,
Professor Laurence Tribe demonstrates through myriad examples that
process values themselves reduce to substantive measures, and that it
is impossible to separate process from substance. He shows that "un-
just" determinations invariably flow not from a flawed process, but
rather from the underlying substantive outcome.92 Perhaps in recog-
nition of the difficulty of elevating values other than factual accuracy
very high in the pantheon, when Summers returned to the topic he
inspired twenty-five years earlier, his support for process values apart
from the pursuit of truth seemed to have waned considerably. As he
summarized, "in my view, the burden of persuasion should always be
on those designers of the system who wish to justify the recognition of
any factor that may lead to divergence" from substantively accurate
adjudication. 93
89. Id. at 476; see also Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in DUE
PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII, supra note 82, at 182, 201.
90. Of course, our claim is not that factual accuracy is the only due process value; our claim is
that it is the most significant.
91. Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Val-
ues," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1974); see also Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process
Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111
(1978).
92. Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1077 (1980).
93. Robert S. Summers, Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judicial Fact-Finding-
Their Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases, 18 LAW & PHIL. 497, 509 (1999). It a ges-
ture to his prior work, Summers asserts that "[i]t is simply not so that the exclusive business of a
trial court in all disputed cases is to find the actual truth." Id. at 500. Testing any human institu-
tion by whether it has an "exclusive" policy or goal will almost surely lead to a negative answer.
Solum applies this approach in his exhaustive review of procedural justice, and not surprisingly
concludes that there are variables other than factual accuracy that influence the structure of the
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By no means do we intend to claim that a concern for accuracy
explains all aspects of the legal system. Rather, the point is that the
aspiration to achieve factually accurate outcomes is the single most
important variable, although other values are at stake. When factual
accuracy and other values conflict, the other values tend to give way.94
Put more simply, though a wide variety of values are at play in any
given due process determination, these concerns boil down to a con-
cern for accuracy. 95
In fact, many scholars have chastised the current mode of
noneconomic damage assessment as plagued with "arbitrary indeter-
legal system. Solum, supra note 78. That he has to work so hard to bring the significance of
other values to the surface indicates how submerged they are by the pursuit of factually accurate
decisions. Indeed, reflecting the general consensus, Solum notes the undeveloped nature of the-
ories of procedural justice. Id. at 183. Exactly so, because the focus of due process is largely on
factually accurate outcomes. We want to give an accurate description of how due process is
viewed today; whether this view is right or wrong is not our concern.
94. Interestingly, this is true in the criminal arena as well, which is not our concern in this
Article. To be sure, there are some criminal doctrines that sacrifice factual accuracy at the altar
of other social interests. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But most, such as the
confession rule and most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are designed to guarantee factu-
ally accurate outcomes. Moreover, on a few occasions when the Court has rendered a truth-
defeating decision, it has quickly limited the damage. A perfect example is the controversial
right to proceed pro se found in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). This is truly truth-
defeating, but the Court soon held that standby counsel could be appointed, and could actively
participate in proceedings outside the view of the jury. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168
(1984). The Court also found no right to appear pro se on appeal. Martinez v. Court of Appeal
of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (2000).
95. Our concern about the arbitrary nature of pain and suffering awards is not original, but
previous authors, indeed the entire legal community, has neglected the connection between the
present state of affairs, the absence of a relevant fact of the matter, and due process. For exam-
ple, Fourth Circuit Judge Paul Niemeyer complained about the irrationality of pain and suffering
awards. Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of Our
Tort System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401 (2004). Consistent with our fundamental premise, Judge
Niemeyer argues that "[w]ithout rational criteria for measuring damages for pain and suffering,
awarding such damages undermines the tort law's rationality and predictability-two essential
values of the rule of law." Id. at 1401. He proceeds to argue that the irrational nature of dam-
ages for pain and suffering makes them virtually identical to punitive damages, and goes so far as
to argue that noneconomic compensatory damages "are even more vulnerable to constitutional
attack." Id. at 1415. Damages for pain and suffering, he urges, effect the same arbitrary depri-
vation of property as punitive damages do. Id. at 1417. We think this is close, but not quite
right. Pain and suffering either does or does not involve factfinding. If it does, the fact of the
matter needs articulation; if it does not, then Judge Niemeyer is correct.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas disagreed with the Court's finding in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore that an excessive award of punitive damages could result in a due
process violation. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). They argued that "if the Court is correct, it must be that
every claim that a state jury's award of compensatory damages is 'unreasonable' (because not
supported by the evidence) amounts to an assertion of constitutional injury." Id. at 607 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Why they object to this conclusion is unclear. Arbitrary deprivation of property
is perhaps the central concern of the Due Process Clause. They apparently believe the Emperor
is fully clothed, but he is not.
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minateness. ' '96 Professor Mark Geitsfeld makes an argument consis-
tent with ours. He contends that damages for pain and suffering do
not involve exclusive factfinding by the jury, and instead are analo-
gous to punitive damages and should be treated as such. 97 Our argu-
ment simply takes the point one step further; we argue that if
noneconomic damages are facts, as the Supreme Court has held, 98
then they must have some reasonable basis in fact.
IV. CONCLUSION
Pain and suffering and other intangible harms are quite real, and
there is widespread belief that those who suffer wrongly should be
compensated (and a less widespread belief that individuals should in-
ternalize the true cost of their actions, which also cannot be accom-
plished without accurate factfinding). Nonetheless, if noneconomic
compensatory damages involve "facts," and facts involve true states of
an external reality, then due process requires that these facts be found
using reasonably reliable methods. Moreover, there must be a mea-
sure by which the accuracy of adjudication can be judged; that mea-
sure is largely absent in the contemporary legal system.
One way to address the problem of determining a reliable damage
figure is to conceive of it as a sampling issue, where the central con-
cern is the deviation from the norm rather than the production of out-
liers. A system that relies on juries (or judges) as a sampling
procedure must take into account that a large number of cases will
inevitably produce outliers. A mechanism is needed to bring verdicts
close to the means or medians of similar cases. Courts implicitly rec-
ognized this point from the founding era up until the twentieth cen-
tury; during that time, the courts kept tight control over jury damage
awards, notwithstanding the oft-stated proposition that juries had sig-
nificant discretion.99 Modern courts have pursued a different path,
with the predictable result of unpredictable damage assessments that
challenge the core concept of the rule of law. The solution to this
problem lies in taking seriously the claim that noneconomic damages
involve factfinding-or, alternatively, extending the rules governing
punitive damages-which in turn requires a reliable determination of
96. Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Dam-
ages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV, 331, 338 (2006) (citing Jaffe, supra note 17, at 224-25).
97. Id. at 346.
98. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) ("A
jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination,
whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation."); St.
Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 661 (1915).
99. See Allen & Brunet, supra note 1.
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the value of harm as reflected in decisions over time or some equally
objective substitute. The critical facts at stake are matters external to
the mind of the factfinders, not simply subjective assessments of their
own perceptions. Their own perceptions matter only to the extent
they are a reliable gauge of more widespread community consensus or
accurately appraise the relevant facts of the matter.
Damage caps and excessiveness review have been offered as solu-
tions to the problem with noneconomic compensatory damages, yet
neither truly solves the problem. Damage caps merely cut off the ex-
tremely inappropriate outlier rather than bring it back toward the
mean and median of general verdicts over time. Again, the problem is
not to limit damages under some arbitrary figure, but instead to en-
sure that they are rationally determined. Excessiveness review does
nothing to address the irrational nature by which these damages are
determined, nor does it respond to the demands of the Due Process
Clause for accurate adjudication. Under excessiveness review, dam-
age verdicts are deemed to be excessive if they shock the conscience
or reflect passion and prejudice on the part of the jurors. 100 Excessive
verdicts can result in remittiturs, reversals, and new trials. Again, the
difficulty with determinations of noneconomic damages is their lack of
rationality, not their excessiveness. Determinations of damages have
to get the matter right rather than simply avoiding "shocking the con-
science" of reviewing judges. Thus, neither remittiturs, which reduce
damages to an amount that does not shock the conscience, nor review
for excessiveness, which has the same effect, respond to the demands
of due process for accurate adjudication.
Consistent, predictable decisionmaking can be achieved through
legislative schedules or trial and appellate mechanisms that produce
consistent results that accurately reflect community decisions over
time. At trial, comparability could be litigated directly and a robust
system of comparability review could also help ensure that verdicts
reflect widely held community views. 101
The legislative schedules could come from state legislatures or from
Congress, but they must come from somewhere if the rule of law is to
be maintained. State control over tort liability is unproblematic for
the most part, but it seems fairly plain to us that Congress could regu-
late noneconomic compensatory damages as well (although we are
largely indifferent to this matter, and our argument does not turn on
it). Recall our opening example. Unconstrained damages are an open
100. See, e.g., Tisdel v. Barber, 968 F. Supp. 957, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See generally DeCamp,
supra note 11.
101. See generally Baldus et al., supra note 16.
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invitation for the citizens of one state to transfer the assets of other
citizens-frequently citizens of other states or foreign entities-to
their own neighbors. This has a direct effect on the costs of doing
business; it amounts to one part of the country seeking rents from
another. The Supreme Court has announced a three-part test to de-
termine whether a particular activity may be regulated under the
Commerce Clause. Congress can regulate channels of interstate com-
merce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and whatever has
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 10 2 The Supreme Court
spoke on this issue most recently in Gonzales v. Raich.10 3 In Raich,
the Court held that "[o]ur case law firmly establishes Congress' power
to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 'class of
activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,"'1 4
and that only a rational basis is needed for concluding that a particular
activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 05 Damage actions
against entities doing business across state lines plainly meet this
test.10 6 In any event, the point remains that the transfer of assets with-
out a factual basis violates due process, and the articulation of the
factual basis must come from somewhere if the practice of awarding
noneconomic compensatory damages can be justified.
The Seventh Amendment is no bar to this process. Comparability
review existed at common law, and thus does not violate the right to a
jury trial. 10 7 As our empirical study has shown, there was a wide-
spread practice of reversal and remittitur of jury assessments of
noneconomic damage awards, demonstrating that this practice is one
deeply rooted in history and tradition. Importantly, the demand for
rational decisionmaking reflected in the tight control over damages
exercised by judges is also deeply rooted in history and tradition.
Most importantly, unreliable determinations of damages eviscerate
102. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995); see also United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (finding the Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional because it did not
regulate economic activity).
103. 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005).
104. Id. at 17.
105. Id. at 22.
106. See, e.g., Patrick Hoopes, Note, Tort Reform in the Wake of United States v. Lopez, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 785, 785-86 (1997). After the Court's decision in Lopez, some worried
that Congress's power to enact far-reaching tort reform was significantly reduced. But Raich,
the Supreme Court's most recent Commerce Clause decision, almost surely resolves that the
Clause is not a bar to tort reform legislation See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status
of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524,
624 (2005) ("Today Congress looms much larger in our political system, and Article I has been
interpreted expansively. Even under United States v. Lopez, it seems highly unlikely, for exam-
ple, that a court would deny Congress the power to enact national products liability law.").
107. DeCamp, supra note 11, at 248; see also supra notes 30-36.
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the core of the Due Process Clause's commitment to the rule of law.
The solution is simple and pragmatic: articulate the fact of the matter
that can reliably be determined by evidence. The Seventh Amend-
ment would not be offended. The common law, state legislatures, or
Congress could articulate the pertinent facts that the Due Process
Clause requires before the assets of one person are given over to
another.
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